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Abstract: 
This work shows that defective behaviors from the cooperative equilibrium in the management of 
common resources can be fueled and triggered by the presence of agents with myopic behaviors; a similar 
phenomenon is also possible with cooperative motivations. 
This paper demonstrates and discusses that the apparent and detectable decay of the cooperative choices 
in the dilemmas of common resources are not an exclusive and indisputable signal of an escalation in 
free-riding intentions, but can also be an outcome of the present-biased preferences and myopic behaviors 
of the cooperative agents.  
In fact, within the context populated by conditional cooperators with a heterogeneous myopic discount 
factor, in the absence of information about agents’ intentions, the present-biased preferences can trigger a 
strategy that directs the community to excessively increase its harvesting level, even in presence of the 
other-regarding motives.  
The behavior implemented by naïve agents, even if done with cooperative intent, can activate a dynamic 
of cascading defections from the cooperative strategy within the harvester group. Therefore, a lowering of 
the cooperative behaviors can also be the effect of the absence of coordination instruments in response to 
the cognitive bias that influences human behaviors. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the task of managing common resources, one of the main issues that a community 
faces is avoiding the trigger of the tragedy of the commons. A not-collapsing 
management of the commons greatly depends upon the cooperative capacities of the 
communities and their ability to maintain the cooperation inside the group over time. 
This study will show when and in what manner there is involvement of present-bias in 
the triggering of strategies that contribute to non-cooperative behaviors in common 
harvesting. 
Cooperative behaviors have been largely investigated in behavioral economics (Fehr 
and Gächter, 2000; Gächter, 2007; Sally, 1995), and other-regarding and social 
preferences are found in everyday life (Gintis, 2000), in a wide range of situations 
(Alpizar et al., 2008; Frey and Meier, 2004; Meier and Stutzer, 2008) and within 
different cultures (Henrich et al., 2005). However, in the presence of social preferences, 
when individuals participate in a common pool resources or public good game, in the 
absence of coordination and enforcement instruments or institutions, there is frequently 
a decay of cooperative behaviors (Andreoni, 1988; Dawes and Thaler, 1988; Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999; Gintis, 2000; Gintis et al., 2003; Isaac et al., 1994; Ledyard, 1994). 
When individuals cooperate only when others also cooperate (conditional cooperators), 
the presence of free-riders, or individuals without full cooperative behaviors, can trigger 
a dynamic of defection by cooperation (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fischbacher and 
Gächter, 2010). However, when resource management includes specific intertemporal 
peculiarities with relevant externalities, resource harvesting is vulnerable to the risks of 
inefficiency in intertemporal management, as it results from the difficulties that people 
often encounter in defining intertemporal choices and allocating consumption in a 
consistent manner. This phenomenon refers to the existence of present-biased 
preferences. In fact, individuals, due to their impulsivity, follow short-term benefits 
without considering adequately the long-term consequences, particularly in situations in 
which the individuals systematically behave by discounting the near future more than 
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the distant one (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992). These behaviors reveal the lack of self-
control in the face of the pressure of the present (Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue and 
Rabin, 1999); so, when there are present-biased preferences, the immediate benefit 
directs the choices despite the long-run interest. This is true also in the case of a social 
dilemma. In Herr et al. (1997), for example, participants interact in a common pool 
resource experiment that reveals a lower efficiency when the experimental design 
provides intertemporal externalities, manifesting fundamental short-sighted behaviors. 
Participants, in fact, do not adequately consider the future consequences of their 
decisions, and they show short-sighted behaviors in dynamic games (Pevnitskaya and 
Ryvkin, 2013).    
Myopic behavioral patterns are particularly dangerous in the context of common 
resources because they can generate rapid resource depletions. Generally, common 
resource dilemmas are defined within a context in which the long run choices and short 
ones can conflict, thus exposing the resources to the risks derived from present-bias. 
Thus, the role played by present-bias in the decay dynamics of cooperation in the 
commons could be consistent with the systematic decline of the cooperative propensity 
with the passage of time. In fact, one of the salient elements that is present in the 
common resource experiment is the progressive decay of the cooperative behaviors with 
the advancement of the interactions between the agents (Ostrom, 2000).  
When resources are commons with intertemporal harvesting peculiarities, the decay of 
cooperation intentions can be the main obstacle to the preservation of a given stock of 
resources. With the consequence of the reduction in the community welfare, hence it is 
clear why the decay of cooperation in the commons has so much relevance. However, in 
this context, the role played by the cognitive biases is not adequately investigated. The 
questions of if and in what manner such phenomena like present-bias can affect the 
dynamics of the cooperation and its eventual decadence have yet to be raised. It is also 
remarkable that even though it is beyond any doubt the existence of cooperation 
capability as part of the human evolutionary success (Gintis, 2009), it is unclear why 
societies sometimes fail to achieve the level of fairness and cooperation that they desire. 
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Therefore, this work presents a representation of human behaviors that do not exclude 
these cognitive foundations of the process of decision-making in the intertemporal 
context. Without the necessary inclusion of the intertemporal cognitive features of 
human behavior, the models used to describe the human phenomena in resource 
harvesting are unable to include the real issues that can trigger the defective strategies 
from cooperation in the management of the common resources generating 
overexploitation. 
 
2. Present bias and why take care of it in the commons 
 
Present-bias refers to behaviors that result from the duality of the discount rate in short-
term and long-term periods that determine a non-consistency time behavior in tasks that 
require intertemporal planning. Time inconsistency implies that an optimal choice 
defined at the present could be revisited in the future (Strotz, 1955). The present bias 
thus determines the emergence of preference reversals that generate a conflict between 
long run preferences and immediate choices, resulting in a conflict between the early 
intention of the agent and the choice made at the moment. The genesis of these 
phenomena has a solid cognitive foundation. In fact, it is noteworthy that researchers in 
the fields of cognitive neuroscience support a non-constant discount rate finding two 
ways to process the discounting: one for the immediate rewards and another for the 
delayed ones.1 Experiments reveal an activation of the limbic circuit just prior to the 
choices that provide an immediate reward (McClure et al., 2004). Similar conclusions 
                                                 
1 Two distinct brain areas are involved in the definition of intertemporal choices. The first area, the limbic 
and paralimbic, is a brain region heavily innervated by the dopaminergic system and connected to 
rewards expectation (Breiter and Rosen, 1999; Knutson et al., 2001; McClure et al., 2003), while the 
other area belongs to the front-parietal region, an area that supports the higher cognitive functions 
(Loewenstein et al., 2008). 
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were also drawn by Hariri et al. (2006), and McClure et al. (2007). 2  The joint 
involvement of two systems in decision-making processes is further supported by 
Bechara (2005), Bechara et al. (1999), Damasio (1994) and LeDoux (1996); therefore, 
for consumer choices defined in an intertemporal context, the dualism between the 
limbic system and the deliberative-cognitive system of the neocortex highlights a 
distinction between the reactions in responses to short and long-term stimuli. Where 
information regarding immediate rewards is mostly subjected to processing by an 
impulsive system, instead a more appropriate reflective system refers to decisions 
regarding long run rewards. It is possible to assert that the present bias is an element of 
the decision processes deeply rooted in human nature, in several areas of the 
individual’s life. In fact, the present biased behaviors are also clearly evident in several 
situations (Della Vigna, 2009; Frederick et al., 2002; Thaler, 1981) and different 
contexts, such as the low saving rate (Ashraf et al., 2006; Harris and Laibson, 2001; 
Laibson, 1997; Laibson et al., 1998), health choices (van der Pol and Cairns, 2002), 
drugs, smoking or buying addictions (Frederick et al., 2002; Gruber and Koszegi, 2001; 
Thaler and Shefrin, 1981; Wertenbroch, 1998), and procrastination behaviors (Benabou 
and Tirole, 2003; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). The unifying factor in all these fields 
is the contrasting dichotomy between long-term well-being and immediate enjoyment, 
this dichotomy characterizes the emergence of present biased behaviors. Present-bias 
seems, therefore, to be a specific peculiarity of decision heuristics on intertemporal 
choices in frameworks where long-term plans can be subject to revision and where the 
                                                 
2 The limbic circuit is the seat of the emotional reaction processes (Hariri et al., 2000) and impulsive 
behaviors (Pattij and Vanderschuren, 2008); in fact the limbic system - the most ancient part of a human’s 
brain – also includes the amygdala (Isaacson, 1974), whose functions are closely related to emotional 
activities (Cardinal et al., 2002; Hariri et al., 2002). Vice versa, a second area that it is afferent to the 
neocortex, the most recently formed brain area from an evolutionary perspective, shows prevalent 
activation in correspondence of actions that are the outcome of choices that take future gains into 
consideration best. This second area, exclusive to mammals and distinctly developed in humans (Rachlin, 
1989), plays a key role in appropriate deliberative-cognitive activities. 
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long-term outcomes depend upon a continuum of instantaneous or short-term choices. 
This feature also defines the framework of common resource dilemmas. In fact, the 
intertemporal management of the commons has the characteristics of the framework in 
which the long-term and short-term choices can conflict, exposing the resources to the 
risks that are come from present-bias. In the fields of the resources exploitation the 
present-bias and naïve behaviors could prove very dangerous for the maintenance of the 
resources, in fact in the absence of time consistency, an undesired collapse of the natural 
resources could occur (Hepburn et al., 2010). Hence, when a conflict arises between the 
short and long-term interests, as in the management of common resources, present-
biased preferences are likely to play an important role.  
It is well known that the commons is a field in which the relevant elements of human 
choosing are not limited to the area of intertemporal resources management, but also 
one in which human sociality plays a crucial role. On one hand, the adoption of 
sustainable and cooperative behavior in relevant social dilemmas depends on the degree 
of consciousness about the effect of their own behaviors on others, and on the common 
resources; this inclination finds form in cooperative and other-regarding motives. On 
the other hand, the choices made reflect the capability of correctly reading and weighing 
the costs and benefits that result from one’s own choices. The intertemporal decision-
making processes that involve present biased preferences directing these choices are 
also the paths by which individuals solve social dilemmas. Within this process 
cooperation also finds realization. For these reasons, the cooperative and intertemporal 
dynamics need to be analyzed together.  
The contributions to understanding the role of other-regarding preferences in social 
dilemmas are abundant in the literature and reveal that the cooperation and fairness 
principle contributes in the formulation of the agent's choices (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; 
Gächter, 2007; Ostrom et al., 1994). Several works have investigated the true 
foundations of economics when the actors make decisions within a social context, 
showing with undisputed clarity that the individual’s decisions are mediated by other-
regarding motives and by prosocial concepts like fairness, cooperation and reciprocity 
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(Andreoni, 1990; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Falk and 
Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Rabin, 1993). Furthermore, the 
consequences of the introductions of the other-regarding preferences in the theoretical 
frameworks on the management of the commons draws great attention and offers 
additional elements of analysis for applications in environmental and resource issues 
(Brekke and Johansson-Stenman, 2008; Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2012; 
Gowdy, 2008; Gsottbauer and van den Bergh, 2011; S. Frey and Stutzer, 2006). 
Additionally, in the specific field of commons several analyses and investigations have 
confirmed the ability of human beings to voluntarily sustain the cooperation in 
resources dilemmas (Casari and Plott, 2003; Charness and Villeval, 2009; Chaudhuri, 
2011; Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2011; Ledyard, 1994; Ostrom et al., 1992).  
However, we cannot merely emphasize the presence of the cooperative will of 
individuals; there is also a need to truly comment on the frequent observations, 
especially in the field of controlled experiments, of a systematic decadence of 
cooperative propensity over time and with the prosecution of the interactions among the 
agents (Ostrom, 2000). The reason for the decay of the cooperation propensity over time 
is an argument of discussion and great interest. This decay is of great relevance, not 
merely theoretically, but also from the applied perspective: it is known that when 
confronted with resources, which are intrinsically commons and having an 
intertemporal harvesting peculiarity, the decay of the cooperation instances can become 
the main obstacle to the preservation of a given stock of common resources over time 
and generations. However, in this context, the part played by the cognitive biases has 
not been adequately explored. If and in which manner phenomena such as present-bias 
can affect the dynamics of cooperation and its eventual decay continues to remain 
unclear. But, as it has been discussed here, the dynamics of harvesting in the commons 
has a double determination that involves both the cognitive and social spheres, two 
spheres that are defined as one in the intertemporal decision-making processes and the 
other in the cooperative attitude. So the role played by present-biased preferences in the 
decay of cooperation must be clarified, showing that shortsighted behaviors deriving 
from present-bias can be involved in a decadence of cooperative interactions over time 
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and within a framework that includes common resources, even when agents have 
preferences for cooperation. Therefore, in the following sections it will be shown the 
manner in which the present-bias is involved in the triggering of strategies that 
contribute to a non-cooperative behavior in common harvesting, determining cascading 
defections. 
 
3. Harvesting model and baseline emerged behaviors  
 
The model concerns the activity of harvesting from a stock of non-perishable resources, 
a discrete time framework is considered where the stock of resources at time t is R(t) 
with 0 ≤ t ≤ T and T ≠ ∞, and the quantity harvested is expressed as h(t). The 
fundamental equation that determines the dynamics of the growth of the resources 
subject to the harvesting is as follows: 
𝑅(𝑡 + 1) − 𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡))𝑅(𝑡) − ℎ(𝑡),  (1) 
where the growth rate, 𝑓(𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡)), is not negative.3 In the case in which the stock size 
does not affect the growth rate, the resource stock grows at a constant and strictly 
positive exponential rate equal to 𝑔, such that: 
𝑓(𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡)) ≥ 0 and 𝑔 > 0 with 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇],    (2) 
and 
if 
𝜕𝑓(𝑔,𝑅(𝑡))
𝜕𝑅(𝑡)
= 0 → 𝑅(𝑡 + 1) − 𝑅(𝑡) = (𝑔 − ℎ̂)𝑅(𝑡)  with  ℎ̂ =
ℎ(𝑡)
𝑅(𝑡)
 .   (3) 
The time interval from 0 to T is the finite lifetime of a single agent. Moreover, the initial 
stock of resources and the growth rate are known by all the agents. 
                                                 
3 The non-negative growth rate derives from the non-perishability of the resources.   
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The initial stock at time zero is strictly positive. It is assumed that resources are 
material; therefore, negative stock of resources is not possible: 
𝑅(𝑡) ≥ 0  with  𝑅(0) = 𝑅0 ∧ 𝑅0 > 0    ∀  𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇]. (4) 
The amount harvested at time t by the agent, h(t), is not restorable, therefore, 
ℎ(𝑡) ≥ 0  ∀ 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇].  (5) 
The agent faces a capacity constraint: in each period he cannot harvest more than hmax, a 
value that is strictly positive and finite, and thus, together with the non-negativity 
constraint, is expressed as: 
0 ≤ ℎ(𝑡) ≤ ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥    ∀  𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇]    with   ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 > 0 and ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≠ ∞.   (6) 
Furthermore, each agent also faces a resources constraint such that he cannot harvest at 
time t more than the stock of resources available in that moment: 
ℎ(𝑡) ≤ 𝑅(𝑡)    ∀ 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇].  (7) 
Both the capacity and resources constraints are assumed to be exogenous and equal for 
all the agents. 
The model assumes only material resources and no exchange market; hence, the welfare 
of the agents depends only on the amount of resources harvested and enjoyed at the time 
of harvesting, so the lifetime utility of the agent evaluated at time 0 is: 
𝑈 =∑𝛿(𝑡) 𝑢(ℎ(𝑡))
𝑇
𝑡=0
. 
 
(8) 
The agent's preferences are monotonic and strictly concave on the amount harvested:4 
                                                 
4 In this way the existence of a unique optimal solution is guaranteed.  
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𝑢′(ℎ𝑡) > 0     𝑢
′′(ℎ𝑡) < 0    ∀ ℎ ∈ ℛ
+.     (9) 
The discount factor δ(t) represents the degree of impatience on harvesting. Agents 
exhibit impatience on the harvesting time such that 𝛿′ < 0,5 so the discount factor is 
monotonic and decreasing over time with: 
𝛿(𝑡) > 𝛿(𝑡 + 1)  ∀𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇]. (10) 
To summarize the problem of the optimal harvesting path, the agent maximizes the 
utility function (8) under the constraints expressed in (4), (6) and (7) when the initial 
condition and the natural growth rate respect the non-negative constraints and the 
dynamic of resources’ growth respects (1).  
So, assuming continuity for the harvesting amount on the interval [0, hmax], given the 
discount factors D={δ(0), … , δ(t), … , δ(T)} that respect the peculiarity just enounced, 
it becomes clear that in the agent’s lifetime, at any time 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇], there is just one 
optimal solution for the problem of maximization that the agent has to face.  
 
Of course, the intertemporal harvesting plan depends upon the form of the discount 
factor, in particular if it is expressed in an exponential way that guarantees time 
consistency, or if the agent has some other form of discount that generates time 
inconsistency such as, in our case, the present bias.  
Hence two possible and alternative outcomes from the process of optimization are 
considered. The first is the no-bias optimal harvesting strategy expressed as: 
𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 = {ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑇)}.  (11) 
The no-bias optimal harvesting strategy, Hopt, is the strategy defined when the discount 
                                                 
5 With this assumption, the case of pleasure in procrastination, δ'(t)>0, is excluded. 
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factor of the agent is expressed in an exponential manner that guarantees time 
consistency. 6 Hopt also corresponds to the long-run optimal harvesting plan for the agent 
(O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2002). It is clear and trivial, that in presence of time 
consistency, the agent does not vary his optimal strategy with the passage of time.   
The second possible outcome of the process of optimization, the biased harvesting 
strategy Hbias, takes place when time inconsistency is assumed. Time inconsistency 
implies that the discount factor of the agent is not constant over time, so it is assumed 
that: 
{
 
 
𝛿𝑡
𝛿𝑡+1
>
𝛿𝑠
𝛿𝑠+1
      with   𝑡 < 𝑠   and   𝑠 ∈ [0, 𝑇]  for 𝑡 = 0,
𝛿𝑡
𝛿𝑡+1
≥
𝛿𝑠
𝛿𝑠+1
      with   𝑡 < 𝑠   and   𝑡, 𝑠 ∈ [0, 𝑇]  for 𝑡 > 0.
 (12) 
The consequences of a no constant discount factor can be defined here. 
 
Postulate 1: If it is solved at time t, t < s, with 
𝛿𝑠
𝛿𝑠+1
=
𝛿𝑠+1
𝛿𝑠+2
, the problem of intertemporal 
optimization in the interval [s,T], with an existent unique optimal solution: 
𝐻𝑡 = {𝐸[ℎ(𝑠)]𝑡 , . . . , 𝐸[ℎ(𝑠 + 1)]𝑡, . . . , 𝐸[ℎ(𝑇)]𝑡} , where E[h(s)]t is the expected 
harvesting amount for time s; and at time s, the same optimization problem is solved in 
the interval [s,T] with the following optimal solution: 
𝐻𝑠 = {ℎ(𝑠), . . . , 𝐸[ℎ(𝑠 + 1)]𝑠, . . . , 𝐸[ℎ(𝑇)]𝑠}; when E[h(s)]t < R(s) and E[h(s)]t < hmax if 
a time s 
𝛿𝑠
𝛿𝑠+1
>
𝛿𝑠+1
𝛿𝑠+2
 with 
𝜕𝛿
𝜕𝑡
< 0, then ℎ(𝑠) > 𝐸[ℎ(𝑠)]𝑡. 
 
                                                 
6 Agent has no biased preferences when 
𝛿𝑡
𝛿𝑡+𝑛
=
𝛿𝑠
𝛿𝑠+𝑛
 ∀ 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇] and ∀ 𝑠 ∈ [0, 𝑇] . Only when the 
discounting respects this condition can the agent’s evaluation of the optimal strategy in every period s 
between 0 and T conducts to the same optimal harvesting strategy evaluated in any period t in [0, T]. 
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So, as anticipated, the agent can be present-biased and, in this case, the biased 
harvesting strategy can be expressed as: 
𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 = {ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(0), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑇)}. (13) 
Hbias is derived from the instantaneous maximization at each time of the utility of the 
agent as well the Hopt; but, in contrary to the case of no-bias optimal harvesting strategy 
the discount factor incorporates the present-bias peculiarities expressed in (12) under 
the constraints expressed earlier.7 The consequences can be synthetized in the following: 
 
Lemma 1: Given an expected harvesting amount formulated at time t, hopt(s) > 0, with t 
< s, t and s in [0,T] and hopt(s) < hmax, under the assumption of present bias defined in 
(12), if R(s) > hopt(s) and R(s)=E[R(s)]t, where R(s) is the resources stock at time s and 
E[R(s)]t is the expected stock estimated at time t, then at time s the agent harvests an 
amount greater than the amount predicted for the same period in the optimal strategy 
formulated at time t, hopt(s), that could be harvested in absence of bias:  
ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑠) > ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑠)  with ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑠) ∈ 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡  and ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑠) ∈ 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠. (14) 
 
In fact, when R(s)=E[R(s)]t, referring to the time interval [s, T] at time t for the no-bias 
condition, the agent will face the same situation faced at time s, but under the bias 
condition. So it will be that 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 ≻ 𝐻𝑖 at time t, where Hopt is the optimal harvesting 
plan evaluated at time t and Hi is any other harvesting plan different from Hopt in the set 
of all possible plans, and Hopt is defined under the hypothesis of an exponential discount 
such that  
𝛿𝑠
𝛿𝑠+1
=
𝛿𝑠+1
𝛿𝑠+2
 with 
𝜕𝛿
𝜕𝑡
< 0 and, ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑠) ∈ 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡. But 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 ≻ 𝐻𝑖  at time s with 
𝛿𝑠
𝛿𝑠+1
>
𝛿𝑠+1
𝛿𝑠+2
 and 
𝜕𝛿
𝜕𝑡
< 0, hence at time s the situation expressed in the postulate 1 takes 
                                                 
7 It is notable that both the hyperbolic that quasi-hyperbolic discounts respond to the properties defined. 
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place, so because ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑠) < ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∧ ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑠) < 𝑅(𝑠) it will be ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑠) > ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑠). 
So, given a context in which it is effectively possible to assist in a reduction of the stock 
of resources, the existence of present-biased preferences could move out the harvesting 
path. This context is characterized by a situation in which it is not possible for the 
agents to avoid a total exploitation of the resources before the end of the periods if they 
harvest continuously the amount hmax in the interval [0,T]. It is obvious that this is the 
context in which the agent is called to determine a harvesting plan in which there is the 
following condition:  
𝑅0 +∑ [[𝑅(𝑡) − ℎ(𝑡)] ⋅ 𝑓(𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡))]
𝑇−1
𝑡=0
 −  ∑∑ [ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 ⋅  (1 + 𝑓(𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡)))
𝑡
 ]
𝑇−1
𝑡=0
𝑁
𝑛=1
≤ 0, (15) 
where N is the number of agents that harvest from the stock.  
The (15) implies that there is at least in one period where h(t) < hmax, then considering 
that the agent has the tendency to distribute his consumption over the time, we assume 
that the agent’s intertemporal preferences are given such that: 
𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 = {ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0),… , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏), … , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑠)… , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑇) |
0 < ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏) < ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥
∧
0 < ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑠) < ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥
}. (16) 
 
This implies that if ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡) = ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∀ 𝑡 ∈  [0, 𝑡𝑏 − 1], then ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏) < 𝑅(𝑡𝑏) must be 
true in order to have 0 < ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑠) < ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥. So, considering the implications of (15) and 
(16) and lemma 1, it is possible to assert the following: 
 
Lemma 2: Given the condition (15) and (16), and given two possible strategies that can 
be derived by the decision making process of the agent, the first one,  
𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 = {ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑇)}, in which, at time tb, 
𝛿𝑡𝑏
𝛿𝑡𝑏+1
=
𝛿𝑡𝑏+1
𝛿𝑡𝑏+2
 , and the 
second one, 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 = {ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(0), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑇)} , in which, at time tb,  
𝛿𝑡𝑏
𝛿𝑡𝑏+1
>
𝛿𝑡𝑏+1
𝛿𝑡𝑏+2
, then in the time interval [0,T], there exists at least one period, tb, such that 
hbias(tb) > hopt(tb). 
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In fact, R0 is unique and invariable with respect to the strategy implemented. The (15) 
implies that there exists at least one period where hbias(t) < hmax and at least one period 
where hopt(t) < hmax. Given the existence of a first period in which hopt(t) is lower than 
hmax, tb, if hopt(tb) < hmax and hbias(tb)=hmax, clearly hbias(tb) > hopt(tb). Additionally, in the 
case in which hopt(tb) < hmax and hbias(tb)<hmax, because in this first period, it is clear that 
R(tb) has the same value in both strategies, and because R(tb) must be greater than  
hopt(tb), in consequence of (16), taking care of the lemma 1, the present bias as 
expressed in  (12) determines that hbias(tb) > hopt(tb). 
 
The lemmas just enounced have deep consequences in relation to the outcome of 
cooperative behavior implemented by an agent inside a group of harvesters managing a 
common stock of resources. In fact, the same relationship expressed in these 
propositions also exists when an agent inside a group has cooperative behavior. 
In fact, two possible outcomes of the process of maximization also exist in the case of 
cooperative intentions of the agent: one derived using an exponential discount rate and 
the other derived by present bias behavior. Both the outcomes correspond to a 
cooperative strategy, but in the first case it is a no-bias cooperative strategy (from now 
named “optimal strategy”), and in the second case it is a biased cooperative strategy 
(from now named “biased strategy”).  
The context in which the agents cooperate in the management of the commons are so 
defined: the number of the harvester, N, is common knowledge and homogeneity is 
assumed between the N agents in the instantaneous harvesting utilities 𝑢𝑛(ℎ𝑡)  with   
0 ≤ ℎ𝑡 ≤ ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 , ∀ 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁.
8 Recall that the agent does not exercise a deliberative choice 
of one or the other strategies, but can choose between cooperating and being a free-rider 
(or stop cooperating). It is not possible for a biased agent to implement the optimal 
                                                 
8 In the following, heterogeneity will be assumed in the bias factor. 
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strategy; this is a consequence of the naïve nature of a biased agent who is not 
conscious about the implementation of a biased strategy.9  
Therefore, for the single cooperative agent, when he choices to cooperate, the optimal 
solution is given by the maximization of the sum of the utility of the N agents:10 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
ℎ𝑖
 ∑𝑈𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
   where    𝑈𝑖 =∑𝛿𝑖(𝑡) 𝑢(ℎ𝑖(𝑡))
𝑇
𝑡=0
, (17) 
under the constraints and conditions that we have expressed earlier. 
Under the hypothesis of absence of present-bias,11 the cooperative harvesting plan is the 
optimal cooperative strategy: 
𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑐 = {ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑐 (0), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑐 (𝑡), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑐 (𝑇)}. (18) 
It easy to understand that a lower amount left unharvested, with respect to the prediction 
of the optimal cooperative strategy, is also the observable effect of a potential act of 
free-riding. In particular, free-riding behavior at a given time t could emerge when the 
agent harvests an amount greater than the optimal cooperative one: 
ℎ𝑓(𝑡) > ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑐 (𝑡).  (19) 
Proceeding with the no biased behavior, it is understood that a biased cooperative agent 
maximizes the total amount harvested by the group of N agents as expressed in (17) 
when his utility function is: 
                                                 
9 It is recalled that in this model it is assumed naïveté for the biased agents, such that naïve agents are 
fully unaware of their intertemporal inconsistency and of their future re-evaluation of the harvesting 
amounts. 
10 It is assumed there is homogeneity in the utility function, and consequently the cooperative agent 
maximizes the sum of the utilities. 
11The hypothesis is satisfied when 
𝛿𝑡
𝛿𝑡+𝑛
=
𝛿𝑠
𝛿𝑠+𝑛
 ∀ 𝑡 ∈ [0,𝑇]  ∧  ∀ 𝑠 ∈ [0, 𝑇]. 
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𝑈𝑖 =∑𝛿𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡) 𝑢(ℎ𝑖(𝑡))
𝑇
𝑡=0
, 
 
(20) 
where δbias has the properties expressed in (12), will have the biased cooperative 
strategy:  
𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠
𝑐 = {ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠
𝑐 (0), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠
𝑐 (𝑡𝑏), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠
𝑐 (𝑇)}. (21) 
Now, considering the results described in lemmas 1 and 2, given that (15) and (16) hold, 
it is possible assert the following: 
 
Proposition 1: Given two possible outcomes of the optimal solution in presence of 
cooperative intentions of the agent, the optimal no-bias  
𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑐 = {ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑐 (0), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑐 (𝑡), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑐 (𝑇)} , in which 
𝛿𝑡
𝛿𝑡+1
=
𝛿𝑠
𝛿𝑠+1
 ∀ 𝑡 , and the 
bias 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠
𝑐 = {ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠
𝑐 (0), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠
𝑐 (𝑡𝑏), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠
𝑐 (𝑇)}, in which  
𝛿𝑡
𝛿𝑡+1
>
𝛿𝑠
𝛿𝑠+1
  for 𝑡 = 0 and 
𝛿𝑡
𝛿𝑡+1
≥
𝛿𝑠
𝛿𝑠+1
  for 𝑡 > 0 , with 𝑡 < 𝑠 and 𝑡, 𝑠 ∈ [0, 𝑇] , exist at 
least a time tb in [0, T] such that: 
ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠
𝑐 (𝑡𝑏) > ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑐 (𝑡𝑏). (22) 
 
So, if several reasons could lead the agents to defect by a perfect cooperative strategy, 
also a pure cooperative agent can implement a strategy that does not coincide with Hcopt 
even when his aim is ‘cooperate’ because his choices can be affected by limited 
capabilities in using a constant discount rate, as in the case of present-bias. In what 
follows, the manner in which the effect of the present-bias, also in the presence of 
cooperative intentions, can trigger dynamics of defections is exposed. 
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4. Cooperation failure due present-bias  
 
In a situation in which (22) holds, if the agents cannot be sure about the biased nature of 
the choices of others, it is not possible for a member of the group to distinguish if 
another member of the group harvests an amount greater that the optimal cooperative 
because he has free-riding intentions or because it is a cooperative biased action. 
Therefore, an excessive harvesting of some present-biased agent can be erroneously 
interpreted as an act of free-riding, and in a tit-for-tat strategy can trigger a round of 
defections.   
In order to demonstrate this assertion, a situation in which there are only two harvesters 
is considered and they are conditional cooperators that play a tit-for-tat strategy. They 
harvest simultaneously from the same stock of resources. It is possible to assign to one 
agent the capability to suppose that the other agent can be biased, but have no 
information about cooperative intentions of the other or about the biased discount factor, 
so the agent lacks any ability to distinguish the biased agents from the free-riders.12 The 
agents are homogeneous in the instantaneous harvesting utilities, 𝑢𝑖(ℎ𝑡) = 𝑢𝑗(ℎ𝑡), but 
heterogeneity is assumed in the myopic discount factor δbias(t) as defined in (12), hence, 
denoting i and j as the agents, where the agent i has stronger present biased preferences, 
then: 
  
𝛿𝑖
𝑏(𝑡)
𝛿𝑖
𝑏(𝑡+1)
𝛿𝑖
𝑏(𝑠)
𝛿𝑖
𝑏(𝑠+1)
⁄   >   
𝛿𝑗
𝑏(𝑡)
𝛿𝑗
𝑏(𝑡+1)
𝛿𝑗
𝑏(𝑠)
𝛿𝑗
𝑏(𝑠+1)
⁄       with  𝑠 > 𝑡 at least for t=0 (23) 
in a situation in which in the hypothetical case of no bias is  
𝛿𝑖
𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡)
𝛿𝑖
𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡+1)
=
𝛿𝑗
𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡)
𝛿𝑗
𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡+1)
. Now, 
                                                 
12 Here the existence of the possibility that one of the two agents can be not biased is assumed. 
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considering (23), because the instantaneous harvesting utilities are 𝑢𝑖(ℎ𝑡) = 𝑢𝑗(ℎ𝑡) , 
with 0 ≤ ℎ𝑡 < ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥, that (15) guarantees the existence of a tb such that ℎ𝑗(𝑡𝑏) < ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥, 
and considering the results exposed in proposition 1, then: 
ℎ𝑖
𝑏(𝑡𝑏) > ℎ𝑗(𝑡𝑏),  (24) 
where hbi(tb) and hj(tb) are the amounts effectively harvested by the agents given the 
management strategies when behaviors are biased, at least for the agent i, and coincide 
with the cooperative amounts hci(t) and hcj(t) as expressed in (21), then: 
ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑐 (𝑡) ≤ ℎ𝑗(𝑡𝑏) < ℎ𝑖
𝑏(𝑡𝑏). (25) 
Because the agent j does not have instruments in order to distinguish if the higher 
harvesting of the other agent responds to a cooperative biased strategy or to free-riding 
intentions as expressed in (19), the agent can be induced to opt for a trigger strategy in 
the presence of hi(t)>hcj(t) when it responds to a cooperative strategy, such as in 
hbi(t)=hci(t). If agent j interprets hbi(tb) as a free-rider attempt, the trigger strategy of 
agent j may involve an increase in the next harvesting level until the Nash dominant 
non-cooperative amount hj(tb+1)=hmax, while agent i still harvests his own cooperative 
amount such that, if  hi(tb+1) < hmax at time tb+1 is: 
ℎ𝑖
𝑏(𝑡𝑏 + 1) < ℎ𝑗(𝑡𝑏 + 1) with ℎ𝑗(𝑡𝑏 + 1) = ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥.  (26) 
The increase in the harvesting level of agent j cannot be interpreted by agent i as an 
answer to his biased behavior because – as this model assumes – naïve agents are not 
conscious of their bias and are unable to recognize the appearance of their behavior as 
potential free-rider behavior. In fact, naïve agents have incomplete self-knowledge 
regarding the biased nature of their own behaviors.  
Hence, observing an amount harvested by agent j greater than the cooperative amount, 
agent i can interpret the harvesting amount of the j agent as a free-riding behavior 
attempt. It is not motivated from the viewpoint of agent i because he himself has only 
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cooperated until time t+1; consequently, he also can choose to start a trigger strategy 
harvesting at time t+2 an amount equal to hmax. At this time a non-cooperant Nash 
equilibrium is reached in which: 
ℎ𝑖(𝑡 + 2) = ℎ𝑗(𝑡 + 2) = ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥. (27) 
Similar dynamics can also be triggered with a large number of harvesters. So, the 
question that is raised next is how the implication of present-bias in these defective 
behaviors from the cooperative equilibrium can explicate a dynamic of cascading 
defections.  
 
5. A restrictive case of cascading defections 
 
Because the issue is how the present-bias leads towards defective strategies in the 
absence of which such strategies will not occur, it is not necessary to analyze the 
behavior of the agents that deliberately choice to be free-riders from the beginning. In 
this case, any effect of present-bias is not relevant to adopting defective strategies for 
the obvious reason that in presence of free-rider intentions, the defective strategies from 
the cooperative equilibrium are a consequence of free-riding itself a priori with respect 
to the intertemporal bias. Hence, to show the effect of the present bias in the trigger a 
defective strategy it is considered the case in which all the N agents are cooperative.  
The agents simultaneously harvest from the same stock of resources for T periods, the 
features regarding the stock of resources, growth rate, constraints and utility function 
are those used until now and, therefore, it is not necessary to repeat them. Agents follow 
a tit-for-tat strategy, implying that they choose the cooperative strategy in the first 
round, but their cooperative intentions are not common knowledge. Agents are 
heterogeneous in their bias discount factors, and each agent makes his choice of 
harvesting for a given period after having observed the amount harvested by the other 
agents in the period before, which is the only information about others made available.  
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In every period t each agent can do a cardinal order of all the amounts harvested, such 
that it is identifies with h1(t), the amount harvested by the agent that harvests less, and 
in an increasing order Ah until hN(t), where agent N is the one who harvests more: 
𝐴ℎ = {ℎ1(𝑡), . . . , ℎ𝑛(𝑡), . . . , ℎ𝑁(𝑡)}, (28) 
where each n agent can distinguish the n-1 agents that have harvested less than him 
from the N-n agents that have harvested more. 
At every round each agent decides whether to implement the cooperative or defective 
strategy. In the first case, the cooperative amount harvested will be given by the 
maximization at time t of (17), under the usual constraints, for the periods of the 
residual lifetime [t,T]. Otherwise, the defection strategy consists of the adoption of the 
dominant Nash strategy that implies harvesting hmax until the end of the interactions. 
 
Each agent assigns a given probability, pn(f), that other agents are free-riders; pn(f) is 
based only upon the agent’s personal belief, such the same probability to be a free-rider 
is assigned to each other agent, so: 
𝑝𝑛(𝑓) =
𝐹𝑛
𝑁−1
,  (29) 
where Fn is the number of free-riders present in the group estimated by the agent n. 
The estimation is only subjective and is formulated by the agent in a condition of lack 
of information, and thus it is not assumed that this estimation is equal for all the 
agents.13 The agent constructs his personal beliefs with an action of mental accounting 
where he infers the probability used in the actual context from his past experiences in 
other contexts (Gigerenzer et al., 1991). The logical induction derived from the 
                                                 
13 The estimation occurs in a context where each agent is subjected to the complete lack of information 
regarding the real intentions of others; hence, the estimated presence of a free-rider is not related to the 
real presence.  
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representative agent’s subjective long-term memory suggests that, because he 
experienced acts of free-riding in similar contexts, he should utilize his past experiences 
in the present context, assuming a strictly positive probability that other agents could be 
free-riders. Hence, we have that: 
𝑝𝑛(𝑓) > 0  ∀ 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁.  (30) 
 
The representative agent starts harvesting a cooperative amount, hcn(t), continuing to act 
cooperatively as long as he believes that the other agents are also cooperating. The 
strategy instead prescribes the defection when the agent’s belief leads him to estimate 
that at least one agent with free-rider intentions has caused him damage with an amount 
harvested that is greater than the cooperative amount hcn(t). Hence, the condition of 
damaging harvesting occurs at time s when a member of the group takes an amount 
greater than the cooperative one of the agent n: 
ℎ𝑗(𝑠) > ℎ𝑛
𝑐 (𝑠)  with  𝑗 ∈ 𝑁. (31) 
In the case in which the damage occurs because of free-riding, the agent defects. So, at 
each period t the agent n observes the harvesting order, and at time t+1 he will select the 
defective strategy when he has observed the damage occurs, and there is a given 
probability that among the agents who create the damage there is at least one free-rider. 
This probability, 𝑃𝑛(𝐹 ≥ 1), to determine a defective choice, needs to be a value at least 
big enough for the agent to evaluate it as sufficient to the defect: 𝑃𝑛
𝑑(𝐹 ≥ 1). 
Therefore, assuming that s is a period within [0,T] in which (31) holds, the agent defects 
after time s when the following takes place: 
𝑃𝑛(𝐹 ≥ 1)𝑠 ≥ 𝑃𝑛
𝑑(𝐹 ≥ 1),  (32) 
where 𝑃𝑛(𝐹 ≥ 1)𝑠 is the probability condition estimated at time s. Hence, the harvesting 
strategy of agent n will be as follows: 
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ℎ𝑛(𝑡) = {
ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥,  𝑡 > 𝑠 if 𝑃𝑛(𝐹 ≥ 1)𝑠 ≥ 𝑃𝑛
𝑑(𝐹 ≥ 1) ∧ ℎ𝑗(𝑠) > ℎ𝑛
𝑐 (𝑠),
ℎ𝑛
𝑐 (𝑡), otherwise.
  (33) 
The result of the first proposition expressed in (22) and the condition (24) determined 
by the heterogeneity in the bias factor imply that there exists a first period in [0,T] in 
which (31) holds such that the agent n is posed in a condition of damage. The 
observations of the amounts harvested enable the agent to circumscribe the N-n agents 
that determine damage. Among these, the agent n evaluates the presence of the free-
riders in order to verify the realization of condition (32). Therefore, defining 
𝛺 = {1, . . . , 𝑛, . . . , 𝑁|1, . . . , 𝑁 = 𝑓, 𝑐} (34) 
as the set of all the possible compositions of the group on N agents where each agent 
can be a free-rider, f, or a cooperant, c. The number of the possible cases can be given 
by the ordered selections of N-n subjects in 𝛺, with the exclusion of the agent himself, 
(
𝑁 − 1
𝑁 − 𝑛
). 
The probability that there is a situation, where among the N-n agents there is at least one 
free-rider, is given by the ratio between the favorable cases and the possible ones. The 
favorable cases are those where in the N-n agents of the upper sub-group, the number of 
potential free-riders are between 1 and Fn. The probability of presence of a given 
number of free-rider, q, inside subgroup N-n is defined as: 
𝑃(𝐹 = 𝑞) =
 
𝐹𝑛!
𝑞!(𝐹𝑛−𝑞)!
(𝑁−1−𝐹𝑛)!
(𝑁−𝑛−𝑞)!(𝑛+𝑞−1−𝐹𝑛)!
(𝑁−1)!
(𝑁−𝑛)!(𝑛−1)!
, (35) 
where the probability for each agent that f is true, about the event (f,c), is given by the 
subjective estimation of the agent n, pn(f), as derived by (29). 
Therefore, we have: 
𝑃𝑛(𝐹 ≥ 1) =   ∑𝑃(𝐹 = 𝑞)
𝐹𝑛
𝑞=1
, (36) 
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where F is the number of free-riders.  
The defection choice that is derived from (33), given a period s in [0,T] in which the 
condition (31) is verified a first time, occurs if the probability of the presence of at least 
one free-rider Pn(F≥1) is greater than or equal to Pdn(F≥1). Now, considering the value 
of Pdn(F≥1), it is assumed that for a probability of the presence of at least one free-rider 
between the N-n agent that harvests more, close to the certitude that is  𝑃𝑛(𝐹 ≥ 1) ≈ 1, 
each agent n chooses the non-cooperative harvesting; hence, having                     
𝑃𝑛
𝑑(𝐹 ≥ 1) ≤ 1  ∀  𝑛 ∈ 𝑁, it will be: 
ℎ𝑛(𝑡) = ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥  when  𝑃𝑛(𝐹 ≥ 1) ≈ 1   ∀  𝑛 ∈ 𝑁 (37) 
Now, consider an order that includes all N agents, where each n agent has the position 
equal to the position that his harvesting hn has in the order defined in (28). This gives a 
cardinal order that identifies with n=1 the agent who has harvested less and, therefore, 
increasingly until agent N has harvested more than all the others; hence, 
𝐴 = {1, . . . , 𝑛, . . . , 𝑁}.  (38) 
Each agent estimates a probability of the presence of a free-rider among the N-n agents 
that have harvested more than he, Pn(F≥1), as defined in (36). 
It thus becomes easy to understand that, for an n that approaches 1 in the order defined 
in (38), remembering that P(F=q)=0 when n < Fn+1-q, we have  𝑃𝑛(𝐹 ≥ 1) ≈ 1. This 
implies that at least the agent that has the first place, n=1, in the order A at time s, will 
decide to defect starting in period s+1. In this way, a new order A is generated at time 
s+1 in which a new agent takes the first position. 
Keeping in mind (37), at each period t, after it is verified for the first time the condition 
in (31), t > s, at least one agent chooses a defective harvesting amount that is equal to 
hmax from t+1 until T. In fact, at every time t+1 the defection of an agent that, at time t 
was in the condition 𝑃𝑛(𝐹 ≥ 1)𝑡 ≥ 𝑃𝑛
𝑑(𝐹 ≥ 1), determines a new order where at least 
one agent, that at time t+1 had harvested the cooperative amount hc(t+1), evaluates a 
𝑃𝑛(𝐹 ≥ 1)𝑡+1 sufficient for the defection at time t+2. This is because at every period 
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there is a new agent n in the first place in the order A such that  𝑃𝑛(𝐹 ≥ 1) ≈ 1; hence 
(32) holds true. Therefore, in the following period he will switch from the cooperative 
strategy to the defective one; so, it is possible to assert the following: 
 
Proposition 2: When agents adopt the strategy defined in (33), with heterogeneity in 
the present-bias factor as defined in (12), and they assign a positive probability of the 
presence of free-riders inside the group as in (30), and it is assumed that for every agent 
a probability of the presence of at least one free-rider between the N-n agents that 
harvest more is close to 1, 𝑃𝑛(𝐹 ≥ 1) ≈ 1, makes that (32) holds, and considering that 
there exists at least one period s in [0,T] such that the condition in (31) is verified, then 
for every period after time s at least one agent inside the group stops to cooperate. 
 
The process just exposed auto-fuels time after time and leads, for a sufficiently large 
time of interaction T, to the disappearance of the cooperative actions within the group 
reaching a non-cooperative equilibrium in which all the agent harvest hmax despite their 
previous intentions of cooperation. This process is trigged by the presence of present-
biased preferences. 
 
6. Extensive cases: condition for a cascade of defections 
 
This work has showed that within a context populated by conditional cooperators with 
heterogeneous myopic discount factors, the present-biased preferences can lead to the 
application of a triggered strategy that directs the community to excessively increase 
their harvesting level, even if their motivations were cooperative. With the restrictive 
case, this work has revealed the occurrence of cascading defections, assuming blindness 
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and no-awareness of the bias of others and absence of tolerance for the presence of free-
riders.14 Furthermore it has considered the dominant Nash strategy as the only defective 
strategy implementable. But, conditions that are wider and less restrictive will be 
defined next. Specifically, the conditions regarding the two decisive decision-making 
elements of the defection will be defined: first, the critical level of estimated free-riders 
inside the group, implying that over a given number of supposed free-riders that damage 
the agent, she will not be available to cooperate any further, and consequently the 
defection starts when the estimated probability of the number of free-riders that exceed 
the critical level is considered sufficiently high by the agent in order to defect – and, 
second, the definition of the behavioral strategy adopted. 
 
6.1 Condition regarding the critical value to defect 
 
Only on rare occasions do agents behave under certainty; in the restrictive case the 
implementation of a defection strategy occurred for a probability of the presence of 
free-riders close to certitude, which it is too restrictive to fit well with reality. However, 
we can easily assume that the agent can choose to stop to cooperate in absence of 
certitude as well, without any change in the conclusion drawn in the cascade of 
defections mentioned earlier. In fact, for having at least one agent that stops to cooperate 
at every period is sufficient to assume that the probability 𝑃𝑛
𝑑(𝐹 ≥ 1)  must be 
positive:15 
                                                 
14 𝑃𝑛
𝑑(𝐹 ≥ 1) accurately expresses this absence of tolerance because it expresses that the presence of just 
one free-rider (or the belief that there is a free-rider also because of an erroneous evaluation) is sufficient 
to trigger the defection. 
15 It is trivial that if the defection occurs for a probability of the presence of a free-rider lower that one, 
the result is the same as obtained when the defection begins just in presence to the certitude. 
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0 < 𝑃𝑛
𝑑(𝐹 ≥ 1) ≤ 1       ∀  𝑛 ∈ 𝑁. (39) 
Furthermore, it could be assumed that the agent can consider an estimated presence of 
only one free-rider inadequate to start a trigger strategy, but he may choose to defect for 
more than one estimated free-rider. In this case, agent n is willing to accept the presence 
of a physiological number of free-riders, qn, inside the group. 
We can also extend the nature of this physiological number of free-riders to include 
those who erroneously behave as free-riders. This implies that the agent accepts the 
presence of a given number of agents within his group of harvesting who behave in a 
manner compatible with free-rider intentions. This extension opens up the opportunity 
of introducing heterogeneity within the model, in particular, making it possible to have 
both pure naïve agents and agents that are conscious of the possibility of an erroneous 
implementation of a free-riding harvested amount. For naïve agents, qn represents 
merely the acceptable number of free-riders within the group, whereas for the second 
one it represents the acceptable number of individuals that behave like a free-rider, that 
includes even those who erroneously act as free-riders.16 A sufficiently large probability 
that the estimated number of free-riders is greater that qn will induce the agent to defect. 
Hence, Pn(F>qn) is defined as the probability - estimated by the agent n – of presence of 
more free-riders than the physiological one, among the N-n agents who, with their 
higher harvesting, cause to agent n harm; such that: 
𝑃𝑛(𝐹 > 𝑞𝑛) = ∑ 𝑃(𝐹 = 𝑞)
𝐹𝑛
𝑞=𝑞𝑛+1
. (40) 
The conditions necessary for the defective choice are as follows: 
                                                 
16 For the simplicity of narration, for both kinds of agents, qn refers to the physiological number of free-
riders within the group (without specifying the peculiarity of the case of the no-full naïve agents). 
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𝑃𝑛(𝐹 > 𝑞𝑛)𝑠 ≥ 𝑃𝑛
𝑑(𝐹 > 𝑞𝑛)  with  𝑞𝑛 < 𝐹𝑛, (41) 
where 𝑃𝑛(𝐹 > 𝑞𝑛)𝑠 is the probability evaluated at time s in [0,T] such that the agent 
stops cooperating when at time s the condition in (31) is verified, and the estimated 
number of agents that harvest a compatible free-rider amount exceeding the 
physiological one for a sufficiently large probability of at least 𝑃𝑛
𝑑(𝐹 > 𝑞𝑛), where: 
0 < 𝑃𝑛
𝑑(𝐹 ≥ 𝑞𝑛) ≤ 1       ∀  𝑛 ∈ 𝑁. (42) 
The only condition over qn is that it must be lower than Fn, that is the conditio sine qua 
non to have a conditional cooperant. In fact, if hypothetically the agent takes the non-
cooperative amount only if the number of evaluated free-riders is greater than Fn, it 
means that he is willing to defect for an evaluated presence of free-riders between the 
N-n agents that cause him damage greater than the number that he has assumed to be 
present in the group of N agents, but this is not a real possibility of defecting. In this 
case the behavior is the behavior of an unconditional cooperant, that a priori and 
independently by other elements, always chooses the cooperative amount. 
 
Now, continuing to refer to the strategy defined in (33), but where the condition for 
harvesting hmax at time t > s is 𝑃𝑛(𝐹 ≥ 𝑞𝑛)𝑠 ≥ 𝑃𝑛
𝑑(𝐹 ≥ 𝑞𝑛) ∧  ℎ𝑗(𝑠) > ℎ𝑛
𝑐 (𝑠), in others 
cases the agent cooperates,17 assuming the condition expressed in (41) and (42), it is 
evident that when we assume 𝑞𝑛 ≥ 0, given the cardinal order defined in (38), for n that 
approaches to 1 in the (40), we have: 
𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑛→1
 𝑃𝑛⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  (𝐹 > 𝑞𝑛) = 1.  (43) 
                                                 
17The set of strategies that leads to cascading defections is wider and does not require the strict adoption 
of the Nash dominant harvesting, as will be shown in the following.  
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So also extending the properties of the agent’s behavior to the condition (41) and (42), 
at least one agent in each period is in the condition to defect because given the result 
obtained in proposition 1 that guarantees the existence of a time s in [0,T] such that 
ℎ𝑗(𝑠) > ℎ𝑛
𝑐 (𝑠), and given that 0 < 𝑃𝑛
𝑑(𝐹 ≥ 𝑞𝑛) ≤ 1  ∀  𝑛 ∈ (1, 𝑁), the result in (43) 
ensures that the condition in (41) is verified. Therefore, it is possible assert: 
 
Lemma 3: If each agent assigns a positive pn(f) for every other agent, and for each 
agent the probability of an excessive number of free-riders that implies the defection is 
0 < Pdn(F>qn) ≤ 1 with qn< Fn, then for every period after time s at least one agent inside 
the group will stop to cooperate. 
 
This leads to a decrease in the cooperative behaviors with the passing of the 
interactions, and this decrease depends not on the real presence of an excessive number 
of free-riders but on the impossibility to distinguish the free-rider attempts from the 
cooperative but present-bias choices. 
 
6.2 Conditions for the harvesting strategy 
 
Until now, the only strategy set considered was one that prescribes, as a defective 
choice, the non-cooperative dominant strategy, hn(t)=hmax; but, it is possible to consider 
a wider range of defective strategies. It will be shown that when an agent adopts a tit-
for-tat strategy, it is possible it will result in a cascade of defections, especially if the 
defective choice is different from the non-cooperative dominant ones. In fact, it is 
sufficient to consider the adoption of a strategy that prescribes, that when the conditions 
given by (31) and (41) occur, the agent increases his harvesting of an amount arbitrarily 
greater than those of the precedent period and, that the new amount also guarantees a 
harvesting greater than the cooperative amount. If after the increase, the defective 
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conditions no longer hold true, the agent maintains a harvesting amount not lower than 
the previous one, hn(t-1), provided that this amount is greater that the cooperative one 
for period t, in order to maintain the non-cooperative behavior. Otherwise, he will 
harvest an amount arbitrarily greater than the cooperative one, to maintain the decision 
to stop cooperating after the defection conditions are verified the first time; and, the 
increase in the harvesting occurs each time that the defective conditions are verified in 
order to avoid the permanence of the damaging situation. In this case, 
ℎ𝑛(𝑡) = {
ℎ𝑛
𝑐 (𝑡)
ℎ𝑛(𝑡 − 1) + 𝜖𝑛(𝑡)
𝑚𝑎𝑥{ℎ𝑛
𝑐 (𝑡) + 𝜖𝑛(𝑡), ℎ𝑛(𝑡 − 1)}
𝑡 ≤ 𝑠𝑚
𝑡 > 𝑠𝑚 ∨ 𝑡 = 𝑠 + 1 if ℎ𝑛(𝑡 − 1) > ℎ𝑛
𝑐 (𝑡)
otherwise
with   𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇], 𝑠𝑚 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑆𝑛), 𝑠 ∈  𝑆𝑛 ⊆ [0, 𝑇],
 (44) 
where Sn is the set of all the periods s in [0,T] such that the condition (31) and (41) are 
simultaneously verified. Furthermore, the arbitrary increase must be a strictly positive 
amount just sufficient to have ℎ𝑛(𝑡) > ℎ𝑛
𝑐 (𝑡) and ℎ𝑛(𝑡) > ℎ𝑛(𝑡 − 1), defined as: 
𝜖𝑛(𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑡, ℎ𝑛(𝑡)) > 0 ∶  ℎ𝑛(𝑡) > ℎ𝑛
𝑐 (𝑡)  ∧ ℎ𝑛(𝑡) > ℎ𝑛(𝑡 − 1).  (45) 
 
As shown earlier in proposition 1, there exists at least a time tb in [0,T] such that 
ℎ𝑛(𝑡𝑏) > ℎ𝑛
𝑐 (𝑡𝑏)  when the agent has cooperative but biased preferences, and tb is 
defined as the first period in which, because of the heterogeneity in the bias discount 
factor, given the implication of (23), ℎ𝑗(𝑡𝑏) > ℎ𝑛
𝑐 (𝑡𝑏) with 𝑗 ≠ 𝑛; and at time tb at least 
one agent is in the position to defect in the next round, as shown in lemma 3, because at 
time tb at least for the agent in the first position in the order expressed in (38), the 
condition in (41) is verified. Hence it is possible to define: 
∃ 𝑡𝑏 ⊆ [0, 𝑇] ⇔ 𝐴𝑡𝑏: 𝑃𝑛(𝐹 > 𝑞𝑛)𝑡𝑏 ≥ 𝑃𝑛
𝑑(𝐹 > 𝑞𝑛)  ∧  ℎ𝑗(𝑡𝑏) > ℎ𝑛
𝑐 (𝑡𝑏), (46) 
where 𝐴𝑡𝑏 is the order as in (38) defined at time tb. 
Lemma 3 has already revealed that (46) holds true at least for one agent at each period 
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after time tb when Pn(f)>0, 0<Pdn(F> qn)≤1 and qn< Fn. In fact, assuming the strategy set 
(44), that includes not only the dominant Nash strategies, but all the amounts that 
respond to a defective intention of the agent, for all the agents within the group of N, 
and defining an order as in (38), we have that for every order At for t in [tb,T], given (42) 
and (30), at least for the agent in the first position of the order, the probability of the 
presence of an excessive number of free-riders approaches certitude. Hence, we obtain 
that: 
∀𝑡 ∈ [𝑡𝑏, 𝑇] ∃ 𝐴𝑡 |  for 𝑛 → 1  𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝑃𝑛(𝐹 > 𝑞𝑛) = 1. (47) 
It is, therefore, possible to assert the following: 
 
Proposition 3: In every period  𝑡 ∈ [𝑡𝑏, 𝑇], at least one agent is under the condition to 
increase the harvesting amount in the next period t+1, adopting a non-cooperative 
behavior, that referring to the strategies set defined in (44) implies that: 
∀ 𝑡 ∈ [𝑡𝑏, 𝑇] ∃ 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁 ∶  𝑡 = 𝑠 , 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑛.  
Consequently, if at time t, with 𝑡 ∈ [𝑡𝑏, 𝑇], ∃ 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁 ∶  ℎ𝑛(𝑡) = ℎ𝑛
𝑐 (𝑡), then 
∃ 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁 ∶  ℎ𝑛(𝑡 + 1) > ℎ𝑛(𝑡)  ∧   ℎ𝑛(𝑡 + 1) > ℎ𝑛
𝑐 (𝑡 + 1).  
 
It is thus very clear that during each period some agent increases his harvesting, moving 
away from the cooperative behavior. This implies a tendency over time to change the 
order of the agents derived from their harvesting level, with a translation of the already 
defective agents to a higher position in the order. In this way, the ones who are still 
cooperative take their place on the lower-side positions observing, time-by-time, the 
increase in the probability that implies defective choices. This phenomenon determines 
the increase in the agents that defect by their cooperative behavior over time. 
In fact, assuming the condition revealed in the model, it is given a context that for his 
peculiarities has always at least one agent in the stage of increasing his harvesting over 
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the cooperative level. Therefore, with the passage of interactions, the cooperative agents 
decrease inducing other agents to defect. Agents defect due to their own lower 
harvesting and the increase in the value of the probability as expressed in (40) until the 
level in which the condition expressed in (41) is verified. The consequence of the 
dynamics exposed is a general progressive increasing of amounts harvested, and a 
progressive decay of the cooperative behaviors within the group.  
 
7. Conclusion and final remarks 
 
This work has shown that when the agents are conditional cooperators, the present-bias, 
in the absence of appropriate information or institutions that facilitate the coordination, 
can trigger a cascade of defections from the cooperative strategy like those observed in 
the controlled experiments. Moreover, it shows the conditions and dynamics under 
which the number of individuals that choose to stop to cooperate grows over time.  
It is revealed that, if the agents estimate the presence of free-riders within the group of 
harvesters using their long-term memory, without the information regarding the real 
number of free-riders, the adoption of defective strategies is generated by the 
misunderstanding regarding the real intention of the present biased agents and by the 
restricted self-knowledge regarding their own present biased preferences. 
Thus, when agents can behave conformably to their biased preferences, without any 
instrument of coordination, and sustain their existing desire of cooperation, they direct a 
suboptimal allocation over time of the amount harvested, damaging themselves and the 
others. 
Therefore, the existence of a cascade of defections, which is also seen in presence of the 
cooperative and prosocial preferences, can be explicated by the dynamics triggered by 
present-biased behaviors when the harvesters cannot distinguish the biased choices from 
the free-rider attempts. In this case the decline in cooperation in the management of 
commons could be mitigated by adopting instruments designed to oppose the effect of 
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present-bias. It could be possible to qualify the agent’s choices, not only as a function of 
the amount harvested, but also in relation to their social preferences and intentions. 
Therefore, the drop in cooperative behaviors can also be an effect of the absence of 
institutional instruments to improve the coordination in the face of the cognitive bias 
that affects human behaviors. 
 
The model presented responds to the idea that a true representation of human behavior 
in the social intertemporal dilemma requires the inclusion of the complexity in the 
decision-making process, in particular, of the cognitive factors that affect the choices. 
However, it is not possible to ignore the social dimension of human nature when 
common resources are involved. 
In fact, on the one hand, the adoption of sustainable and cooperative behavior in 
relevant social dilemmas depends on the degree of consciousness regarding the effect of 
the agents’ own behaviors on others, showing interest and care for the common 
resources. This propensity finds form in the cooperative and other-regarding motives. 
On the other hand, the choices reflect the capability of a correct evaluation of the costs 
and benefits that are derived from their own decisions. The intertemporal decision-
making process that direct the choices is also the way in which individuals solve social 
dilemmas. It is within this process that the social preferences find realization. It thus 
becomes very clear that the cognitive aspects and the behavioral traits of the 
intertemporal choices, such as present-bias, are fundamental elements that offer a 
representation of social dilemmas. So the analysis of present biased preferences in the 
intertemporal dynamic is essential in order to obtain a full understanding of the 
dynamics of harvesting (and overharvesting) from the commons. This understanding is 
also necessary to define and create suitable instruments that can sustain cooperative 
preferences. 
 
The results obtained by this work show with clarity that the cognitive factors that affect 
the intertemporal ability of the agents are greatly involved in the abandonment of 
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cooperative interaction over time. However, this is a part of the complexity of human 
decisions, where the causes of a given behavior all interact. Present-bias is one piece of 
the puzzle that, together with the free-rider opportunities, explicates the phenomena 
observed. In fact, the rapidity of the cascading defections depends upon several factors. 
In particular, the presence of heterogeneity in the intentions can contribute to a new 
complexity of the dynamic. But the presence of free-riders, together with the 
cooperative present-biased agents, can only be an additional factor in the rapidity of 
abandonment of cooperative behaviors. Of course, decay in the cooperative intentions 
can also occur independently from the present-bias if the real free-riders are present in 
an excessive quantity, per se. Although these elements affect the rapidity and 
complexity of the defective cascade, but it was not the aim of this work to define this 
speed. Instead, the claim was to show that the observable and observed decay of the 
cooperative choices in the common resources dilemmas are not a unique and 
unequivocal signal of an increase in the free-riding intentions, but can also result from 
present biased preferences and myopic behaviors of the cooperative agents.  
 
In conclusion, the present biased preferences can lead to the application of a trigger 
strategy that can direct the community to excessively increase their harvesting level, 
even if their other-regarding motives were cooperatives. Therefore, a decrease in the 
cooperative intentions can also be the effect of the absence of coordination instruments 
in the face of the cognitive bias that affects human behaviors. 
These conclusions are relevant and useful for policies whose goal it is to support the 
cooperative and sustainable behaviors in the management of the common resources. In 
fact, sustaining the diffusion of the prosocial preferences, if it is an essential prerequisite 
for the adoption of the cooperation in the commons, cannot offer the results desired if 
the individuals and the community lack the necessary instruments for wise management 
of the resources in the face of the risk connected to the present-bias.  
In fact, human behavior follows complex dynamic and decision-making processes. The 
cognitive dimension plays a crucial role and present-bias is one of the elements that, 
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moving far from pure rational behavior, increases the complexity of the human 
interaction in the commons. For these reasons, further studies should be included on the 
interrelation between these cognitive intertemporal elements and the social dimension of 
human nature. 
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